

The Portuguese Case of an Anti Corruption Agency

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Quote:

“Cândida Almeida, former director of the DCIAP (Central Department of Investigation and Penal Action) stressed that Portugal “is not a corrupt country” “I say eye to eye: Our country is not corrupt, our politicians are not corrupt, our leaders are not corrupt”.

Forwards

To be successful, an anti-corruption agency must have the following:

- Governmental political support at the highest level;
- Operational and political independence to be able to investigate even the highest levels of government;
- Sufficient powers to access documentation and interrogate witnesses; and,
- Head of the agency with recognized high integrity.

It is also important that some special powers given to an anti-corruption agency comply with international human rights standards and that the agency works within the legal framework and is subject to judicial proceedings.

When setting the parameters for an anti-corruption agency, a government must ask itself whether it is doing something that it would itself accept if it were an opposition party.

A reasonable and valid formula must be found for everyone, whether government or not, that assigns adequate powers of investigation, powers of prosecution and, at times of greater importance, prevention capacity along with a character that allows it to survive the change of power.

An anti-corruption agency

Two very important circumstances must be taken into account:

- 1) An anti-corruption commission may not be independent if it is under the purview of political leadership and is used as a weapon against criticism; and
- 2) The Agency can become an extortion and corruption agency.

These two considerations relate to aspects of appointment and responsibility.

Appointment of the Head of an Anti-Corruption Agency

At the outset, the model and independence of a committee can be determined by the way in which the holder of the post was appointed or dismissed. If the nomination mechanism allows consensus on someone appointed by parliament and not by the government, and there is an element of accountability outside the government (eg a committee selected in parliament and with the representation of the largest parties) the space for abusive activities can be minimized.

One flaw in many legislative models is that too much control over the appointment and operations of an anti-corruption court is given to a president (or any other political figure). After all, the president is the chief executive and its members may also be tempted.

This can put the president in a thankless position of having to decide whether to accuse political colleagues or not. For example, in Tanzania, anti-corruption legislation has not been effective and has completely lost public confidence.

So it is important that the nomination procedure is one that recognizes that the task of the person in charge will be to maintain control of the executive and, in particular, the political power that is in power.

If the executive, or the ruling party, has free hands to make the nomination, there will be an immediate drop in effectiveness and loss of public confidence. At best, the nominees risk being seen as resource elements that can be replaced when the boat starts to rock; in the worst of the alternatives, they will be seen as party puppets. It follows that the act of nomination has to be such that it involves a wider range of actors than that representing power.

Specific nomination procedures vary from country to country, but either must ensure that the specific mechanism in place sufficiently isolates the nomination process, ensuring that the elected person is a person of integrity and is sufficiently protected during his term.

Furthermore, the holder of the office must have the status equivalent to that of a judge in a higher court. The dismissal of the same should not be at the discretion of any powers, but regulated and only motivated by incompetence or improper conduct.

An anti-corruption agency, in general, cannot pursue a president during his term as he is usually constitutionally immune.

Challenging procedures are generally regulated by parliament, under the guidance of the president of the parliament itself. This flaw can be resolved if the anti-corruption legislation is in favour of the anti-corruption agency communicating to Parliament the

results of its investigation in its entirety, if there are solid grounds that the president has seriously offended the law and evidence of it is accepted in court.

Therefore, it would be the responsibility of the president of the parliament to proceed in compliance with parliamentary regulations.

As the powers of suspension must also be included in the legislation, they can be easily disregarded.

The relationship between the anti-corruption agency and the director of the attorney general's office is also critical. What is the use of evidence if the suspect is not prosecuted?

Generally, under the constitution, the director of the attorney general's office is given oversight over all charges and the power to intervene in all criminal proceedings initiated by any other person or authority.

However, when looking at the independence and effectiveness of the anti-corruption commission, the question is whether, constitutionally, the prosecutor enjoys sufficient independence for the prosecution exercise, ensuring that there is no possibility of political interference.

The relationship with the public is also important for the preventive function of the anti-corruption agency or commission.

The model should provide for the involvement of a wide range of people and interests in the formulation of prevention policies and in their implementation. In this sense, guarantees of a different nature are involved in the prevention process, and their own institutions - both governmental and private sector - can be mobilized in support of the commission's efforts.

Another important factor is to determine how in practice the commission can change the practices of corruption without extending its competences, engaging in coercion. It would be foolish to think that all recommendations from a committee are always relevant and practical.

It may therefore be counterproductive to give a commission the power to demand specific changes. Some countries have found that a public service can ignore a list of anti-corruption recommendations.

What is the solution?

Could parliament, perhaps through its annual report or by any other means, be used as a forum where departments that have failed to cooperate can be questioned and urged to resolve the failures by reviewing harmful practices?

Another factor to be taken into account when establishing the legal model for an anti-corruption agency or commission is ensuring that adequate powers are granted to access documentation and interrogate witnesses.

Freezing of funds, Seizure of passports, Protection of informants, Professional privileges

It is important that the anti-corruption agency or commission has the power to freeze those funds that people under investigation can use to their own advantage.

This, in cases where speed is essential, must be possible before obtaining a court order. Without such competence, banks can easily transfer money electronically in a matter of minutes.

There must also be a corresponding enforcement right for the Supreme Court in cases where a third party feels injured.

It is also common for a commission to have the power to learn and confiscate travel documentation in order to prevent the escape of a certain person from the country, a power that supposes the reasonable conviction that some act that could be penalized was carried out.

If a suspect is being investigated and the person in charge of the agency or commission believes that he or she can flee the country, the commission can detain him, even without waiting for a court order.

Often, the agency or commission has the power to protect informants. In some cases, informants are subordinate government agents who denounce the corrupt activities of their superiors.

But they cannot be expected to collaborate if they thereby risk their jobs or expose themselves to forms of persecution.

There must be legislation that protects informants and provides them with physical protection - extended, if necessary, to home protection or, in exceptional cases, abroad.

The legislation must also ensure that professionals <legal practitioners>, accountants and auditors may be required to disclose certain information about their clients' businesses.

Control of Deposits and Income of Those Responsible for Public Sector Decisions

A vital resource in preventing corruption, the commission's primary raison d'être, is a well-organized and effective system for controlling deposits, income, financial charges and living standards of both public decision-makers and public service officials. that

occupy positions of contact with the public and a privileged position to extort bribes - for example, in the treasuries of the public farm or in taxation. Since such a system must be implemented effectively, it must be decided whether the commission will have policing responsibilities, for example, on income taxes. If other entities have this task, the commission should be allowed to temporarily access these elements.

Corruption in Public Supply Contracts

The use of the payment of “commissions” to local agents is the most frequent source of corruption in international transactions. (see Chapter 12). This practice threatens healthy decision-making, increases the national debt and translates into little or no amount of tax on that same “income”. The public is triple harmed.

Thus, legislation instituting an anti-corruption agency or commission may compel anyone who proposes public contracts - and their local agents or others - to fully disclose all commissions and bonuses paid on their offers and to provide, or require, full details of the services provided by such commissions. Such disclosures must be made at the time of the offer and again within the six months following the closing or suspension of the contract.

The agency must remain as small as possible in order to minimize the chances of, by numerical probability, becoming a centre of corruption itself. It must have adequate powers to request input from other law enforcement officials and forces committed to maintaining national integrity when necessary.

Agency staff can be expected to undertake specialized investigative tasks necessary to apprehend the illicit gains produced by corruption.

For example, an experienced government official suspected of corruption was checked by investigators at his country's anti-corruption agency while on vacation abroad with his family. This employee spent large sums on the purchase of clothing and jewellery and purchased an apartment on behalf of a relative. In addition, it uses credit cards issued by a foreign bank.

Investigators recorded the movement of illicit money through the bank that issued the cards. In this regard, the cultivation of cooperation between anti-corruption agencies in several countries can be particularly valid.

Particular care should also be taken in the appointment mechanisms and in guaranteeing the security of mandate so that the top positions of the agency are held by those with broad public trust.

In addition, particular attention should be paid to monitoring the performance of employees at all levels in the agency. However, just as an anti-corruption agency can be manipulated by those in the upper levels of government; it can also be used to harass political opponents.

The High Authority against Corruption (Portugal)

It is very difficult to speak of an organization that has passed away years ago. This difficulty is made even greater by the fact that portuguese Law 26/92 of 31 August, which terminated the The High Authority against Corruption, determined in its article 4, paragraph 4, that:

“The General Archive of the High Authority against Corruption can only be open to public consultation after 20 years from the date of its remittance to the National Archives / Torre do Tombo (National Archives)”, which extends the duty of confidentiality to which all agents of the High Authority against Corruption are bound in relation to the facts that they have known in the exercise or because of the exercise of their functions. (Article 7, No. 1, of Law No. 45/86, of October 1).

I – Creation of the High Authority against Corruption in Portugal

The High Authority against Corruption was created by Decree-Law 369/83, of 6-10, «with the purpose of preventing, investigating and reporting to the competent authority for criminal or disciplinary action against acts of corruption and fraud committed in the exercise of administrative functions, within the scope of the activities of the central, regional and local public administration and of the Armed Forces, of publicly owned and publicly owned institutions and companies owned by the State or public service concessionaires ».

With this diploma, the State assumed the urgency of adopting exceptional measures to fight corruption, aiming to give a prompt and complete answer to public concerns in this matter.

The Organization thus established was endowed with means of investigation, “free from special formalities to protect the interests at stake, but without jeopardizing the legitimate interests and guarantees of the citizen” and without creating overlapping areas with the powers of institutions already in place.

Law no. 45/86, of 1 October, took care not only to expressly underline the character of total independence of the High Authority against Corruption, but also to reinforce it, namely through:

1. The election of the High Commissioner by the Assembly of the Republic by a two-thirds majority of the deputies present. (article. 2, no. 1)

2. It extended its attributions to the acts performed by holders of political positions in the sovereign bodies. (article. 1, no. 1)
3. It expressly enshrined the duty of cooperation with the High Authority of public and private entities. (article 6, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4)
4. The High Authority formally was submitted to the Assembly of the Republic. (Parliament) (article. 1, paragraph 1)

II – Organization and work of the High Authority against Corruption

II - 1 - Budget.

The expenses of the High Authority against Corruption were borne by funds entered in an autonomous chapter of the budget of the Assembly of the Republic (Parliament), expressing the exercise of the respective attributions, in accordance with the following basic principles.

- Independence of the Office.
- Economy of human resources, with preferential recourse to employees on request or service commission;
- Computerization of bureaucratic activity and procedural support;
- Quick response to requests received within the scope of the respective competence.

Decree-Law No. 446-A / 88, of 9 December, adjusted the competence of the High Commissioner to authorize expenses to the statute conferred on him by Law, No. 45/86, of 1 October.

II - 2 - Facilities and Equipment

In terms of facilities, the High Authority has always used the facilities provided at the beginning of its operation by the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in the Building at Rua Prof. Gomes Teixeira in Lisbon, despite the fact that Law 45/86, of 1 October, transferred the High Authority's operations to the Assembly of the Republic (Parliament), carrying out the respective maintenance and renewing the equipment allocated to it.

With the approval of Law 26/92, of 31 August, which extinguishes the High Authority, the equipment incorporated in the building was transferred to the General Secretariat,

as well as some computer equipment that the Assembly of the Republic intended to dispense with.

II - 3 - Personnel

In order to carry out its duties, the High Authority against Corruption uses the strictly necessary personnel, almost entirely linked to the Public Function and privileging the functions of a technical nature, while guaranteeing for themselves the complete performance of all the tasks legally committed to the Office, which functioned with full autonomy.

The High Authority did not have a map or staff, and the High Commissioner is responsible for designating, exonerating, requesting, detaching or contracting, under the terms of the applicable law, by order of the High Commissioner himself without any other formalities, as per article 12, no. 2 , of Law No. 45/86, of 1 October.

During the term of Dec. Law nº 369/83, of 6 October, which establishes the High Authority, the hiring, requisition or secondment of personnel was done on the proposal of the High Authority to the Prime Minister. (articles 13, 14, 15 and 16).

III – Journeys on the Phenomenon of Corruption

At the inauguration ceremony for the election of the High Commissioner, which took place on 26 October 1998, he himself publicly expressed his intention to organize the Days on the Phenomenon of Corruption, which took place on 26 and 27 January 1990, in National Defence Institute, Lisbon.

These Days were organized, taking into account the preventive aspect of High Authority against Corruption attributions and aimed precisely to broaden the reflection on the generic theme “acts of corruption and fraud”, covering sociological, economic, political and legal aspects, as well as their implications in the functioning of the State and democratic institutions.

In this sense, a set of questions was elaborated that could allow the theme to be deepened and that, without pretending to exhaust or even limit it, would facilitate its adequate framing.

The various themes addressed, either in the interventions during the Days, or in supporting texts collected and presented, equates the incidence of the phenomenon of corruption in society, in the economy, in the State, before the public opinion and, finally, in the perspective of the fight against corruption .

Thus, in the Days of the Corruption Phenomenon the themes were addressed:

Society and Corruption - by António Barbosa de Melo

Economics and Corruption - by José da Silva Lopes.

State and Corruption - by Vasco Nunes da Silva

Corruption and public opinion - panel moderated by Mário Mesquita, with José Pedro Castanheira, Miguel Sousa Tavares and Victor da Cunha Rego.

Corruption and the penal law - by Jorge Figueiredo Dias.

Justice and Corruption - by José Souto Moura.

Corruption and the Rule of Law - Panel moderated by António Sousa Franco, with António Traz Teixeira, António Vitorino, Rui Manchete and Vital Moreira.

Fighting Corruption - Prevention Strategies - by John A. Gardiner and Kathryn Malec.

All of these interventions were edited by the High Authority Against Corruption in January 1991, in a magazine entitled "Interventions".

Another magazine entitled "Support Texts" was also published, with the collaboration of individuals from the most diverse sectors of activity and whose works represent significant contributions to the understanding and in-depth study of the general theme and, as well as to multiple manifestations and specific implications of the phenomenon of corruption at home and abroad.

Personalities of wide representation were invited to attend the meetings: from the judicial authorities; political forces; governmental area; research, inspection and inspection bodies, whether in the administrative area or in public banking; employers', trade union and professional associations; Universities and the student and youth association.

These Journeys allowed, for the first time in our country, specialists from multiple areas to openly discuss their different conceptions or approach to the phenomenon of corruption and other realities related to it, and the impact that this accomplishment found with the majority of bodies media, which made it possible to broaden that debate.

IV – Activity of the High Authority against Corruption

It is difficult to objectively measure the effectiveness of the High Authority against Corruption.

- The High Authority: wasn't a police body or a judicial body, nor was it a coordinating body for inspection bodies.

- The High Authority:

1- Did not investigate, it found out;

2- Did not order, promoted;

3- Did not judge, participated;

4- Could inquire or request an inquiry, but did not propose or apply sanctions;

5- cooperated with the courts, but did not have the capacity to intervene in the process.

The procedural activity of the High Authority against Corruption was based on the collection of evidence that justified well-founded suspicions of an act of corruption or fraud or of any harmful act in the public interest.

To this end, it welcomed the requests of the official entities with competence for the action provided for in the law, the complaints submitted by natural or legal persons who addressed it and also, on the initiative of the High Commissioner when there were signs or news that would constitute the practice of acts corruption and fraud committed in the exercise of administrative functions.

Once the legal admissibility of the matter had been verified, the High Authority carried out the measures pertinent to its clarification and / or promoted its effectiveness by the entities in whose competence it seemed best could be carried out successfully.

External diligence was carried out through the transfer of advisors to the entities and departments concerned by the matter, triggering cooperation between public entities, namely those with powers of judicial investigation, police, investigation, inspection, or inspection, taking into account with a view to obtaining the essential elements that could allow the High Authority's inquiries to continue in its specific scope of action.

Over the more than 9 years of existence, the High Authority against Corruption procedural activity, although legally devoid of special formalities, followed strict criteria with regard to the object of the investigated matters and the limits imposed by the Constitution and the laws for the collection of evidence, having the rights and legitimate interests of citizens and legal persons are always present.

The High Authority against Corruption made about 3000 investigation cases.

These processes had the following evolution:

- About 22.5% were filed out of court, for not being included in the respective sphere of competence or for lack of sufficient reasoning.
- About 7% were filed after investigating their admissibility under the High Authority against Corruption
- About 12.5% were transferred to competent entities, depending on the respective matters or because the issues are already pending there.

In relation to the remaining 58% of cases initiated at the High Authority against Corruption and which merited in-depth investigations.

- About 14.5% of these cases gave rise to the timely communication of the elements collected within the scope of the Office to other instances, where they were more appropriately placed.
- About 14.5% originated criminal participation.
- About 22% originated participations of an administrative or disciplinary nature.
- And about 2% gave rise to proposals for the adoption of legislative or administrative measures.

It will be said that the High Authority, in addition to its procedural activity:

- It sought to develop a social conscience to repudiate corruption.
- Sponsored the study and prevention of the phenomenon of corruption - organizing, inter alia, the days on the phenomenon of corruption.
- Developed a multi-disciplinary intervention methodology to combat corruption.
- Encouraged organic adjustments by other bodies, whether inspecting, supervisory or judicial, which are useful for improving the fight against corruption.
- Supported, within the scope of its specific competence, investigations and investigations in matters of corruption and fraud carried out within the scope of inspections by the various government departments, the police and the courts.
- Articulated with the Ombudsman service specific (and complementary) ways of combating factors that facilitate illicit or ethically condemnable practices - taking as a starting point the Protocol signed between the two entities on 22 March 1984.
- Diligent in the broader scope “that each one should do his duty”, insisting, supporting, criticizing, not letting go, bothering.

- Tried in all circumstances to oppose feelings of impunity or permissiveness, firmly refusing the easy use of amnesty or prescriptive "solutions".

V – The High Authority against Corruption General Archive

Throughout its existence, High Authority against Corruption produced and received numerous documents that constitute a significant documentary collection, both procedural and administrative.

Much of this documentation was sensitive, given the High Authority against Corruption powers and powers and the legal imperative of absolute secrecy to which it was bound.

These reasons - in addition to the space problems - and the need to preserve many of these documents and to issue copies of them justified by the High Commissioner the adoption of measures related to the archiving of that documentation.

Thus, after several studies carried out by the High Authority against Corruption:

1. It raised with the Secretariat of State for Culture the consideration of appropriate normative measures.
2. He initiated the technical deepening of issues related to normative measures, with the support of the Portuguese Institute of Archives.
3. Presented to the Government a draft legal diploma regarding the creation of the High Authority against Corruption General Archive.

Following these interventions, Regulatory Decree No. 52/91, of 8 October, which created the General file of A.A.C.C .. was published.

On 17 October 1991, the AACC Archivist Conservation Regulations were approved, prepared in collaboration with the Portuguese Archives Institute, after obtaining the agreement of the Secretary of State for Culture.

On November 4, 1991, the Ministry of Finance's Institute of Informatics was also proposed to accompany the entire subsequent process, bearing in mind the innovative nature of the project in terms of Public Administration.

In accordance with the combination of art. 4, no. 2, Law no. 26/92, of 31 August, Regulatory Decree no. 52/91 and the AACC Archival Conservation regulation, the following were created:

1. The General Archives Monitoring Committee;
2. The Technical Commission for the evaluation of the proposals submitted to the public tender (which included the participation of elements designated by the Portuguese Institute of Archives and the Institute of Informatics of the Ministry of Finance)

After the deadline for the submission of proposals for the public tender, the Technical Commission of the tender proceeded to open the proposals and their analysis, which included testing the equipment proposed by each competitor and according to the model and questionnaire of which they were informed.

Under legal terms, the Institute of Informatics of the Ministry of Finance issued an opinion of agreement.

Finally, on February 25, 1992, the public tender held by the High Authority against Corruption for the purchase of equipment for the Optical Disc Archive System, which took the designation ("SADO / A.A.C.C."), was formally awarded.

After the organization of the General Archives was concluded, the High Commissioner against Corruption preceded, in accordance with article 4, paragraph 3, of the Law, nº 26/92, of August 31, to the shipment of the General Archive, as well as the equipment to it for the National Archives / Torre do Tombo (national official archive centre), where they were incorporated.

Under the terms of article 4, no. 4, of the Law, no. 26/92, of 31 August, the General Archive of the High Authority against Corruption can only be opened for public consultation after 20 years have elapsed since the date of its submission to the Archives. Nationals / Torre do Tombo, which took place on May 17, 1993, according to Desp. 7/93, of April 16, 1993, of the High Commissioner, published in D. R., II series, nº 103, of May 4, 1999, that is, from May 2013.

VI –The High Authority against Corruption Extinction Process

Over time and since the creation of the High Authority against Corruption, the conditions of society, economic and institutional development have been altered in which the creation of the High Authority against Corruption has been inscribed. The characterization of the phenomenon of corruption as well.

Significant changes were made, whether normative or organic, in some structures of the State, which were legal and especially dedicated to the prevention and effective fight against irregularities and crimes of an economic scope, including corruption and fraud, namely at the level of the Public Ministry, Judicial Police, Court of Auditors,

Ombudsman, Inspections and inspection and control bodies. Some of these traditional bodies with competence in this matter showed increasing availability for the exercise of that activity.

On the one hand, there were functional and methodological adjustments with the Portugal member of the EU, such as the customs sector, with the reduction of risk areas - free movement of people, goods and capital -

On the other hand, it is worth noting the substantial and progressive reduction of the State sector, with a consequent decrease in public agents, such as privatizations, banks, public companies ...

The High Authority against Corruption was not indifferent to the positive evolution that took place, sensitizing public opinion, stimulating the plurality of approaches to the phenomenon of corruption, preventing, participating in judicial (criminal) or disciplinary action, proposing inhibitory measures, and above all, directly influencing or indirectly different entities and structures to better prepare themselves to address this type of crime with renewed effectiveness.

In view of a change in the characteristics of corruption, and fearing a qualitative development, the commitment of citizens and institutions (public and private) cannot be exercised in a transitory way, but must be part of a clear strategic political option. .

It has always been accepted and defended that the High Authority against Corruption was an exceptional and transitory entity, destined to overcome the absence or maladjustment of traditional structures in the face of the phenomenon of corruption and to create conditions for the proper and opportune adjustments according to the will of the power political.

The fundamental question is whether there was a necessary political will to the reinforcement of the inspection mechanisms that must be inherent to the democratic exercise of the rule of law, namely the transparency, impartiality and impartiality of the Public Administration.

Such mechanisms necessarily involved the attribution of jurisdictional powers to the High Authority against Corruption, which came to be raised in the one before the last constitutional revision, and their rejection was clear.

The High Authority intervened positively for the adjustment of society and the rule of law, fulfilling the role that was assigned to it in that it knew how to preserve in all its activity a rigorous independence reaching the objective for which it was created.

It was within this context that the High Commissioner proposed, under the terms of article 9, paragraph g), of Law no. 45/86, of 1 October, to the Assembly of the Republic (Parliament), appropriate institutional seat, a proposal for a law in which unequivocal

and as an urgent imperative to pronounce on the definition of the High Authority's perspectives against Corruption, presenting, alternatively, two proposals.

The first: - The reform of its Organic Law with the redefinition of the institutional characterization, the designation, the universe of action and the breadth of its inspection, inspection and control powers.

The second. - To decide clearly on the termination of the activity of the High Authority against Corruption

However, this last proposal was conditional on the definition of a calendar that had as its objective:

- Maintain the independence of High Authority against Corruption action.
- Avoid justified and perverse deviations from the High Authority against Corruption duties and powers.
- Ensure the regularity of the respective administrative and procedural functions.
- And provide the Assembly of the Republic (Parliament) with adequate monitoring of the entire process.

The Assembly of the Republic opted for the extinction of the High Authority against Corruption, and the conditions that were fixed were fully respected.

Thus, in 1992.07.07, the draft Law nº 199 / VI - Cessation of activity and extinction of the High Authority against Corruption, was admitted to the Bureau of the Assembly of the Republic (published in the Diário da AR, nº 52, II Série-A , of 17 July 1992 (official newspaper).

On the 17th of July, the plenary session of the Assembly of the Republic debated the aforementioned Bill, which was approved in general, specialty and global final vote that same day, having been approved, with the votes in favour of the P.S.D (social democrats), the P.S. (socialist party) and the P.S.N .; vote against Mrs Leonor Beleza and abstentions from P.C.P. (Portuguese communist party), Os Verdes (the ecologists) and independent deputies Mário Tomé and Raul Castro.

On the 22nd of July, the 3rd Parliamentary Committee considered Note 107/92 of the Legal Counsel of the Assembly of the Republic, having decided to introduce the proposed changes to that information, resulting in Decree No. 26 / VI of the Assembly of the Republic (published in DAR nº 54, II Série-A, of 8 August), which gave rise to Law 26/92, of 31 August.

Under the terms of article 1, of Law 26/92, of 31 August, the High Authority against Corruption ceased its activity on December 31, 1992, and was consequently extinguished.

